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Resumen. El periodo neoliberal ha sido acompañado por una transformación transcendental en el 
seno del sistema de salud estadounidense. Como resultado de una serie de dinámicas políticas e 
históricas, la nueva ley de atención a la salud firmada por Barack Obama en el 2010 –La Ley de 
Cuidado de la Salud Asequible (ACA)-  se basó menos en modelos universales de otros países que lo 
que se propuso en reformas conservadoras anteriores del sistema de salud. Esto fue en parte el 
resultado de la influencia de los intereses de poderosas empresas de salud.  Esta ley expande la 
cobertura sanitaria,  pero lo hace de forma incompleta y desigual, con disparidades aseguradoras y 
vacíos persistentes en el acceso al sistema según el estatus del seguro. Además, la ley incorpora un 
cambio total hacia un modelo consumista de cuidado caracterizado por costes elevados en el 
momento de su uso. Finalmente, la ley promociona una mayor consolidación del sector de cuidado de 
la salud, por ejemplo en unidades llamadas “Organizaciones de cuidado responsables” que se parece 
mucho a las organizaciones de cuidado de la salud promovidas por abogados de la atención médica 
administrada.  El efecto total ha sido el mantenimiento de un sistema fragmentado que ni es equitativo 
ni es eficiente.  Un sistema universal mediante contribuyente único  hubiera podido, en cambio, 
ayudar a transformar  la sanidad en un derecho social. 
Palabras clave: La Ley de Cuidado de la Salud Asequible; modelos universales; el sistema sanitario 
estadounidense; modelo consumista de cuidados. 
 
 
[es] La Ley de Cuidado de la Salud Asequible y la transformación del 
sistema de cuidado de la salud estadounidense 
Abstract. The neoliberal period was accompanied by a momentous transformation within the US 
health care system.  As the result of a number of political and historical dynamics, the healthcare law 
signed by President Barack Obama in 2010 -the Affordable Care Act (ACA)- drew less on universal 
models from abroad than it did on earlier conservative healthcare reform proposals. This was in part 
the result of the influence of powerful corporate healthcare interests. While the ACA expands 
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healthcare coverage, it does so incompletely and unevenly, with persistent uninsurance and disparities 
in access based on insurance status. Additionally, the law accommodates an overall shift towards a 
consumerist model of care characterized by high cost sharing at time of use. Finally, the law 
encourages the further consolidation of the healthcare sector, for instance into units named 
“Accountable Care Organizations” that closely resemble the health maintenance organizations 
favored by managed care advocates. The overall effect has been to maintain a fragmented system that 
is neither equitable nor efficient. A single payer universal system would, in contrast, help transform 
healthcare into a social right. 
Keywords: the Affordable Care Act; universal models; US health care system; consumerist model of 
care. 
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The “neoliberal era” – typically described as beginning sometime in the 1970s and 
continuing to the present – has witnessed great changes in the health systems of 
nations throughout the world.  Some nations in Europe have seen efforts to rollback 
the universal scope, or privatize the delivery, of their universal public health 
systems, trends that may now be accelerating (Reeves, McKee, and Stuckler 2015, 
Pollock and Roderick 2015, Maarse 2006).  The United States, in contrast, entered 
the twenty first century without a system of “universal health care,” with millions 
excluded from health care and many more with inadequate or second-tier care. The 
passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 has been described by some as 
the long-deferred realization of the goal of a right to health care in the United 
States (Obama 2015).  However, for reasons we will explore, this characterization 
is, unfortunately, inapt.   
In this article, we will explore the transformation of the American health care 
system, with an emphasis on the recent reforms of the ACA. Our aim is to 
elucidate the major historical and structural features of the American health care 
system for an international audience, and we do so by taking the following course.  
First, we will succinctly summarize some of the important historical currents that 
explain how and why the United States entered the twenty-first century with a 
rising number of uninsured, despite our uniquely high health care expenditures.  
Second, we will describe the political and health policy origins of the ACA. Third, 
we will describe the factors leading to the passage of the ACA, with a particular 
emphasis on the role of key corporate health interests.  Fourth, we will discuss the 
fundamentals of the ACA-model of “universal health coverage.” Fifth, we will 
assess the current landscape of US healthcare, emphasizing important quantitative 
trends, including the persistent problems of uninsurance and underinsurance. Sixth, 
we will examine how a process of corporate consolidation – in part through the 
emergence of “accountable care organizations” – is unfolding within the American 
health care landscape.  We will conclude by briefly contrasting the ACA model of 
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reform with a potential alternative, namely a single payer national health insurance 
program.  
Though these are US developments, they are highly relevant on the international 
level. The dynamics of health care in America have become increasingly important 
outside of the nation’s boundaries as politicians and policy makers in other 
countries have, to varying extents, interpreted the ACA (or elements within it) as a 
possible model for health care reform (Pollock and Roderick 2015).  By exploring 
the political processes that led to the ACA and highlighting the shortcomings of the 
law from the perspective of policy, we hope to demonstrate the pitfalls of a health 




2. Historical Backdrop 
 
During the twentieth century, the US diverged from most nations in Europe in its 
failure to create a system of universal health care. Understanding the US health 
care landscape today requires contextualizing it within the political history of 
health care reform.  To do this, we can turn to a number of books which examine 
this history, and which highlight the key episodes within it (Numbers 1978, Poen 
1979, Starr 1982, Hoffman 2001, Funigiello 2005, Gordon 2005, Quadagno 2005, 
Hoffman 2012, Starr 2013). The first episode occurred during the “Progressive 
Era,” essentially during a short period around World War I. The second episode 
occurred during the “New Deal” of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a time that 
otherwise saw a major successful expansion of the welfare state.  The third episode 
occurred during the presidency of Harry S. Truman in the post-War II era, which 
corresponded to a crucial moment for welfare state expansion in Europe. The 
fourth episode is somewhat less well defined, but might be described as stretching 
from the successful passage of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965 to the failure of a 
national reform effort in the first half of the 1970s. A rightwing shift in national 
politics caused the next episode to be deferred for decades: health reform as a 
major national concern didn’t again emerge until the Presidency of Bill Clinton in 
the 1990s.  The final, fifth episode was that of the recent health reform struggle 
during the presidency of Barack Obama. Only two of these episodes resulted in 
major legislation: the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 (public health 
insurance programs for the elderly and the poor, respectively) and the ACA in 
2010.   
The relative power of the constituencies favoring and opposing reform in each 
episode slowly shifted over time, reflecting larger changes in the US political 
economy. It’s worth briefly mentioning the reasons for the failure of the first 
moment - the Progressive-era movement towards “compulsory health insurance” – 
because the dynamics of this first “failure” would play out again and again, in 
differing ways, in subsequent health care reform efforts up to the present. These 
dynamics thus help explain the current state of the American health care system.   
Progressive-era “compulsory health insurance,” as it was known, would have 
created systems at the state level roughly similar (with some differences) to Otto 
von Bismarck’s 1883 Health Insurance law in Germany or Lloyd George’s 1911 
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National Insurance Act in Britain (Lubove 1986, 67-68). Historians have identified 
a number of factors leading to the failure of this campaign, and the resultant 
historical divergence of the US from Europe with respect to health policy.  One 
factor was a shift in opinion among physicians, who moved from a position of 
potential openness to reform to one of relentless hostility, the history of which is 
described by Ronald Numbers in his Almost Persuaded (Numbers 1978). A second 
important factor was the emergence of opposition from the insurance industry.  
Though health insurance was essentially nonexistent, the insurance industry 
presciently saw its interests threatened by the reform movement and joined the 
campaign against the bill (Gordon 2005, 212-213). A third factor was the relative 
isolation, and elitism, of the reform movement: health insurance never became 
linked to a broader popular movement (Hoffman 2001, 44, Gordon 2005, 262).  
Indeed, the cause of compulsory health insurance actually split organized labor, 
with the powerful mainstream American Federation of Labor opposed (Starr 1982, 
249-251, Hoffman 2001, 4). Finally, US entry into World War I and the Bolshevik 
revolution provided a useful ideological weapon for those who opposed the 
campaign, insofar as health insurance could be characterized as both German and 
communist in inspiration (Hoffman 2001, 56, 163).   
We outline the factors that resulted in the eventual destruction of the first effort 
at “compulsory” health insurance in the United States because they can be largely 
traced forward, albeit in changed form and circumstances, throughout the coming 
decades.  The opposition of the conservative physicians’ lobby, for instance, would 
remain an important factor into the post-World War II era. The post-World War II 
Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill, which would have established a single payer type of 
national health insurance on more European-lines, was vigorously and successfully 
opposed by the powerful American Medical Association, as described by Monte 
Poen in Harry S. Truman Versus the Medical Lobby (Poen 1979). However, the 
relative power of physicians waned while the role of larger commercial and 
corporate health interests – hospitals, insurance companies, and the pharmaceutical 
industry – rose over the course of the twentieth century. The fate of future health 
care reform efforts, it might be reasonably argued, increasingly hinged less on the 
posture of physicians and more on the lobbying muscle of these corporate interests.  
The third factor we outlined – the fact that movements towards universal health 
care were frequently distanced or isolated from larger social movements – would 
continue to play a role in subsequent failures, but also in shaping the form of 
reform efforts themselves.  For instance, the historian Alan Derickson, who has 
explored the role of organized labor in early health reform battles, notes that 
though labor supported the post-World War II campaign, this never developed into 
a grass-roots campaign. “As a result,” he writes, “no protest movement arose 
among the millions of uninsured and underinsured workers to counterbalance the 
AMA and its allies” (Derickson 1994, 1343). With the failure of post-World War II 
universal health care efforts, labor would increasingly embrace, earn, and expand 
upon private health benefits from their employers (Derickson 1994, 1354-1356).  
And finally, though the German roots of “compulsory” health insurance would 
quickly lose its propaganda value following the end of World War I, the “red-
baiting” of the Progressive era fight for health care reform – i.e. the defaming of 
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reformists as dangerous, foreign, or even traitorous communists – would be carried 
forward into future fights for health care reform, to some extent to the present day. 
These various factors – among others – help explain why, as the United States 
entered the twenty-first century, it continued to lack a system of universal health 
care. Different historians and scholars emphasize some of these factors over others 
as the “deciding” elements in this history, and arrive at different broad theses 
explaining the status quo. In Vicente Navarro’s Marxian interpretation, for 
example, class analysis is the overriding factor of importance. As he has written, 
the balance of power between the working class and corporate interests continued 
to favor the failure of reform over the decades.  With respect to the failure of Bill 
Clinton’s health reform proposal of the early 1990s, for instance, Navarro 
emphasizes that, in the short-term, corporate interests might actually have favored 
universal health care reform, insofar as it would have relieved them of having to 
pay for an expensive employee benefit.  However, given that the provision of these 
benefits actually bolstered employer control over employees, such interests 
preferred the perseverance of status quo (Navarro 1995, 458).  More generally, he 
puts forth elsewhere, it was “the weakness of the U.S. working class,” in 
conjunction with the powerful “capitalist class,” a relatively weak labor movement, 
and the lack of a potent socialist party that “explain the absence of a 
comprehensive and universal health program in the United States” (Navarro 1989).   
The larger story, however, is that over more than 100 years, despite the periodic 
recrudescence of reform movements, the US remained almost distinctive among 
high-income nations in its lack of some sort of system of comprehensive health 
care, for a combination of the reasons briefly outlined here: opposition of key 
groups (first physicians, later larger corporate interests), a divided and/or relatively 
weak labor movement, the ideological power of red-baiting, and the balance of 
power between classes.   
However, within this narrative there is a second point that is of great importance 
in understanding the fundamentals of the Affordable Care Act, namely the 
rightward shift in the goals of mainstream health care reform advocates that 
occurred over the course of the century. This shift coincided with a larger 
transformation in the political economy of the country itself, and can be located 
back to that crucial “neoliberal” decade of the 1970s (Gaffney 2015). Following 
World War II, the proposals of mainstream health care reform advocates followed 
in the footsteps of European-inspired, universal programs.  “The proponents of the 
Murray-Wagner-Dingell bills [e.g. during the Truman presidency],” as Theodore 
Marmor and James Morone have reflected, “took for granted the egalitarian 
argument … that financial means should not determine the quality and quantity of 
medical care a citizen received” (Marmor and Morone 1977, 162).  To some extent, 
Medicare – which universally provided health benefits to all seniors – was 
consistent with this heritage. Likewise, Senator Ted Kennedy’s 1970 Health 
Security Bill – which emerged after organized labor rekindled the fight for 
universal health care in the late 1960s (Quadagno 2005, 110) – would have created 
a universal system along such New Deal lines.  Funigiello decribes Kennedy’s bill 
thusly:  
The legislation offered free universal health coverage, financed partly from 
increased taxes and partly from general revenues. It eliminated patient co-payments 
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and replaced all public and private health plans with a single, federally operated 
health coverage system. (Funigiello 2005, 173) 
Yet this embrace of a single-payer national insurance plan was to prove to be 
short-lived. The neoliberal turn of the 1970s saw the essential abandonment of such 
a fully universal program. As Beatrix Hoffman has emphasized, an overriding 
concern for costs – over an embrace of universalism – came to dominate the health 
care reform proposals of both political parties.  This turn coincided with a larger 
conservative political turn. As Hoffman puts it, 
A consensus soon emerged that universal coverage would not be possible until 
health costs were brought under control … The focus on cost control would lead to 
a new era in US health care history.  Health care activists’ vision of equality and 
universal coverage, which had been shared at least in party by Presidents Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson, came to seem like a relic of a past 
era. All presidents since Carter, no matter their political persuasion, have placed 
cost control at the center of their reform efforts. (Hoffman, 164-166) 
This continued focus on cost control (Hoffman, 206) – and the abandonment of 
the egalitarian, universalist spirit of post-World War II reform proposals – persisted 
into the twentieth-first century, and was reflected in the very name of the law 
which is the central concern of this chapter: The Affordable Care Act.  
Fundamental to this overall shift was the fact that mainstream reform advocates 
had come to see the accommodation of corporate health care interests – which had 
grown enormously in power and resources over the preceding century – as the 
price of any successful reform effort.   
These, in brief, are some of the early historical dynamics underlying the 
political economy of American health care by the 1970s.   
  
 
3. Roots of the Affordable Care Act 
 
As a result of these dynamics, a more conservative health policy tradition emerged 
in the 1970s.  The ACA would draw less on the universalist tradition, and more on 
this more conservative line. Indeed, to no small extent, the ACA brought to fruition 
a conservative model of health reform that can be traced back to Richard Nixon, as 
many have suggested.  It’s important to briefly review the lineage of this model of 
health reform.  In 1971, to counter Kennedy’s Health Security Bill, Nixon released a 
bill of his own, which would have expanded access to health coverage largely 
through private insurers and new “health maintenance organizations” (HMOs); this 
legislation would have included a mandate for employers to provide insurance to 
their workers, together with an expanded government program for the poor 
(Funigiello 2005, 176, Starr 2013, 54). While this would have expanded health care 
access, it would have also maintained a largely privatized system, one which would 
have fell well short of universalism, maintaining tiers of coverage based on class, and 
requiring out-of-pocket payments at the time of health care use (Starr 2013, 54).   
Though it had little success in the 1970s, the idea of expanding access through 
“managed care” would come to play a fundamentally important role in health 
policy both in the United States and abroad.  This “Health Maintenance Strategy,” 
as the physician Paul Ellwood and colleagues described it in a 1971 paper, would 
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consist of a “series of government and private actions designed to promote a highly 
diversified, pluralistic, and competitive health industry …” (Ellwood et al. 1971).  
Notably, it was explicitly conceived as a “market-oriented” alternative to a national 
health insurance system in which “the consumer would be able to purchase health 
maintenance services from a variety of competing organizations” (Ellwood et al. 
1971).  Nixon’s embrace of the HMO in the early 1970s was partly the result of 
Ellwood’s influence (Gray 2006, 318).  In 1973 Nixon passed the HMO Act, a law 
that – as Gray notes – required some employers to offer an HMO plan to their 
employees (assuming one was available).  The law would have little effect initially 
given various requirements that made HMOs unattractive for commercial insurers; 
over the course of the coming decades, however, with major modifications, it’s 
influence would be enormous (Gray 2006).   
Another critical player in the elaboration of the modern managed care system 
was Alain Enthoven. While stationed at the US Department of Defense in the 
1960s, Enthoven and his colleagues developed a “planning-programming-
budgeting system,” an approach to maximizing the efficiency of military spending 
(Waitzkin 1994). Enthoven later went on to become a professor of health policy at 
Stanford, from where he would influentially advocate for a managed care-based 
model of health reform (Funigiello 2005, 192).  As one of us (HW) has explored, 
several themes from Enthoven’s military work carried over into his articulation of a 
system of managed competition, including an emphasis on managerial over 
professional authority, cost analysis, and competitive choice (Waitzkin 1994).  
Ellwood and Enthoven began collaborating in the 1970s, meeting in Ellwood’s 
home in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, together with an assortment of health policy 
academics, officials, and industry insiders (Ellwood, Enthoven, and Etheredge 
1992). Drawing on the idea of the health maintenance strategy, Enthoven published 
his proposed “Consumer-Choice Health Plan” in 1978 in the New England Journal 
of Medicine. In this paper, he proposed a system that, like Nixon’s plan, 
emphasized coverage expansion through the private sector, with an emphasis on 
HMOs. However, his proposal went further in configuring an end to employment-
based insurance, and its replacement with a system of health insurance plans – 
subsidized via tax credits – which would compete for consumers during an annual 
period of open enrollment. Medicaid would be voucherized, while those in 
Medicare could elect to enroll in a private plan instead (Enthoven 1978a).  
Enthoven counterpoised his “Consumer-Choice Health Plan” to the various other 
proposals circulating in the late 1970s during the Carter administration (Enthoven 
1978b). 
Little came of these proposals in the 1970s.  Both Kennedy’s and Nixon’s 
national proposals, for instance, fell through. Yet Nixon’s 1973 HMO law, as 
mentioned, was passed.  With some delay and significant later revisions, it would 
ultimately lead to the rise of powerful, large managed care corporations in the 
1980s and 1990s (Gray 2006).  Just as importantly, however, the intertwined health 
reform ideas of Ellwood, Nixon, Enthoven, and the Jackson Hole group would 
have a great impact on the health care policy proposals of both Democrats and 
Republicans in the decades to come (Waitzkin 1994). Clinton’s health care reform 
proposal would ultimately draw on aspects of this emergent conceptualization of 
246 Gaffney, A; Waitzkin, H. Cuad. relac. labor.  34(2) 2016: 239-261 
 
privatized universal health coverage: in a 1994 address, Clinton even 
acknowledged Nixon as the originator of the idea (Funigiello 2005, 186).   
Similarly, the principles of the Nixon reform proposal were incorporated in the 
state-level health care reform signed into law in the state of Massachusetts in 2006 
by governor Mitt Romney (and later into the Affordable Care Act).3 Like the Nixon 
plan, Romney’s reform expanded the health system for the poor (in the case of 
Romneycare, via the state Medicaid program for children as well as a new 
subsidized insurance exchange) and also incentivized employers to provide 
insurance to workers (Starr 2013, 171-172).  The plan additionally incorporated a 
feature not found in the Nixon plan: an “individual mandate,” requiring those who 
didn’t get insurance through their employer or through the state to buy a private 
plan, an idea sometimes traced back to a 1989 report from the conservative think-
tank the “Heritage Foundation” (Brill 2015, 30).   
The Obama administration’s Affordable Care Act would, to no small extent, be 
modeled on this “Romneycare” model, which itself drew upon the Nixon plan 
coupled to an “individual mandate.”  Despite this history and intellectual lineage, 
however, those who argue that the Affordable Care Act is nonetheless still not a 
Republican Party idea are basically correct (Lemieux 2014).  The Democratic Party 
proposal for healthcare reform drifted, over decades, away from an emphasis on 
universalism, and towards an acceptance of the principles of the Nixon plan of the 
early 1970s.  Thus, by the time Romneycare was passed, this model was, to some 
extent, a Democratic party plan.   
In other words, over the decades of the neoliberal era, the meaning of health 
care reform shifted: the party of the center Left came to embrace what was once the 
vision of the Right.  
 
 
4. Passage of the ACA 
 
The politics and the detailed legislative history of the passage of the Affordable 
Care Act is explored in three recent and useful books, including those of a 
sociologist (Starr 2013), a legislative insider (McDonough 2011), and a journalist 
(Brill 2015). Rather than review the chronological history of the ACA here, we 
instead explore a few critical points about the law’s passage that help us understand 
what it accomplished, and what it did not.     
First, it is important to emphasize at the outset that one underlying impetus for 
the law was, to no small extent, strong public support for health care reform.  
“Health care ranks as the top domestic issue in opinion polls,” as Jonathan 
Oberlander wrote in the pages of the New England Journal of Medicine in late 
2007, “and talk of major reform is back in vogue as the 2008 election approaches” 
(Oberlander 2007). Indeed, in the lead-up to the 2008 election, Kaiser Family 
Foundation health tracking polls found that health care was a leading concern 
_____________ 
 
3 Many have made this point.  One columnist expressed this succinctly as: 
“RomneyCare=ObamaCare=NixonCare=DoleCare.”  Robert Dole was a Republican Senator in the 1990s.  Of 
course, there are also important differences (Budowsky 2012). 
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among voters (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2007a, b, c, Starr 2013, 182).  
This concern likely reflects a number of serious deficiencies of the American 
health care system, such as uninsurance, underinsurance, and high costs. Yet, the 
translation of this widespread public desire for a better health care system into 
actual legislation, as we’ll see, was powerfully molded by a number of key 
corporate interests and political factors.   
Second, there was a consensus among the major Democratic candidates in the 
2008 election that any health care reform would be not overly disrupt the health 
care landscape (Starr 2013, 195).  Although some minor differences arose among 
the candidates, the common ground was clear. “At its core, theirs [the Democratic 
candidates’] was a plan,” as Brill puts it, “any Republican or chamber of commerce 
lobbyist would likely love: The government would create tens of millions of new 
customers for all those profiting from the current system…” (Brill 2015, 18).  The 
Republicans, meanwhile, largely abandoned the Nixon-Heritage-Romney reform 
structure in the 2008 election, and instead embraced a variety of “market-oriented 
reforms” based on such ideas as health savings accounts (Oberlander 2007). 
The third point worth underscoring is that the law’s passage was based on the 
accommodation of key corporate health interests. One strategy for health care 
reform (whether it could have been successful is of course unclear – no doubt the 
barriers would have been formidable) would have been to challenge these interests 
more directly, relying for support on a broad-based popular mobilization.  A 
second strategy – and the one employed by the Obama administration – was to 
avoid confronting these interests by accommodating them (Waitzkin 2010, 2011, 
182-186).  This is how McDonough, an insider in the process, describes the process 
of deal-making:  
Finance Committee staffers – sometimes with White House participation and 
sometimes without – began meetings with drug companies, insurers, hospitals, 
device makers, home health companies, hospices, and others to hammer out 
detailed concessions from each industry to pay for as much of the health reform tab 
as possible. All participants rejected the word deal to describe their deals” 
(McDonough 2011, 76). 
While McDonough describes the “concessions” of these industries, each 
industry also actually had a great deal potentially to gain from the ACA.  However, 
each also had the potential for loss that could result from a more sweeping reform.  
Or, as Brill puts it, 
They each came offering deals – changes they would agree to that would help 
finance reform or otherwise further the goal of getting a reform bill passed.  It was 
implicit, and it would gradually become explicit, that what they wanted in return was 
to avoid more radical reforms that would attack their bottom lines (Brill 2015, 96). 
The “deals,” some of which were explicit and some of which were more 
implicit, are well described by Brill, and can be briefly summarized.  First, the 
essential “deal” between the administration and the health insurance industry had 
been agreed upon early.  The industry lobby group –America’s Health Insurance 
Plans (AHIP) – agreed that in exchange for an “individual mandate” requiring 
everybody to buy health insurance, it would agree and/or support a law that 
precluded discrimination against those who were sick (i.e. no denying coverage 
based on “pre-existing conditions”) (Brill 2015, 52, 107-109, 186-187). The devil 
248 Gaffney, A; Waitzkin, H. Cuad. relac. labor.  34(2) 2016: 239-261 
 
was in the details – for complex reasons, the AHIP would later, in somewhat 
Machiavellian fashion, fund advertising against the ACA (McDonough 2011, 78-
79) – but it was this basic framework that ultimately became law.  A more explicit 
deal was reached with the drug companies (Brill 2015, 125-126), which had both 
much to gain and much potentially to lose from a national health reform bill. The 
fear was that serious reforms – i.e. allowing the government to negotiate with drug 
companies over pharmaceutical prices (a common practice in other countries) – 
would provoke the pharmaceutical industry into an unrestrained public relations 
assault on the bill (Starr 2013, 204-205).  Ultimately, any such deep reforms were 
entirely avoided, and in exchange the industry actually funded $150 million in 
advertising to support the passage of the law (McDonough 2011, 76). Conversely, 
the primary demand of progressives –a so-called “public option” insurance plan 
that would compete with the private insurers – was discarded (Brill 2015, 176).  
The final bill required a great deal more wrangling and revisions, in part as the 
result of the peculiarities of the U.S. political system (McDonough 2011, 82-97).  
Nonetheless – and though many thought it might not actually happen – the ACA 
was ultimately signed into law by President Obama on March 23, 2010.  It has 
subsequently survived two major challenges in the Supreme Court. Republican 
presidential candidates continue today to call for its repeal, though this seems 
unlikely for the time being.  The majority of its provisions are now in effect. The 
ACA – a law with its roots in a reform tradition that can in large part be traced 
back to Republican Party proposals – is now, as its frequently put, the “law of the 
land.”   
But what does it do?  Is it – as many have hoped – tantamount to an 
achievement of long-sought “universal health care”? Unfortunately, the inclusion 
of a fundamental role for private health insurance in the law meant that it would, 
invariably, fall well short of that goal.      
 
 
5. The ACA and the “Three-Legged Stool” 
 
Rather than a provision-by-provision breakdown of the ACA, in this section of the 
article, we’ll briefly describe how the ACA brings the US towards what is often 
referred to as “universal health coverage.” Two points are worth making at the 
outset. First, though the ACA moves the United States in the direction of universal 
health “coverage,” many will still be left uncovered.  But second, even if ACA-
type coverage indeed became available to all US residents, the resulting system 
would still not be true “universal health care” (at least according to our 
interpretation of the term).  This is because, apart from the problem of uninsurance, 
a variety of inequities and barriers to care are inherent in the current US system, 
and will persist. We argue that it would still therefore fall short of health care 
universalism.   
Health insurance coverage in the United States, both before and after the ACA, 
is a private-public patchwork. Most U.S. citizens are covered by employer-
provided health insurance plans, a system which has its origins in the vagaries of 
World War II-era wage controls and tax policies (Quadagno 2005, 49-52). A 
minority purchase private, “non-group” insurance plans on the individual or family 
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level. Additionally, Medicaid and Medicare legislation, passed in 1965, provide 
coverage for two large groups, certain individuals of low income and adults aged 
65 and older, respectively. A variety of other programs cover smaller segments of 
the population. Together, however, this combination of private and public health 
insurance programs nonetheless leaves a substantial fraction of the nation 
uninsured: in 2013, before the main coverage expansion of the ACA had gone into 
effect, 16.7% were uninsured, up from 12.9% in 2000 (Kaiser Commission on 
Medicaid and the Uninsured 2015).   
One way to cover these individuals would have been to enact a universal public 
program that covered everyone; as we have seen, this was not the road taken.  
Instead, the ACA increased health insurance coverage by two primary mechanisms 
(Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2015). First, it expanded 
Medicaid, a means-tested health insurance program for the poor, to a much larger 
number of citizens. The impact of this measure should not be understated.  From 
2014 onward, the Medicaid program was extended to people making 138% of the 
federal poverty level or less (Crowley and Golden 2014). However, the Supreme 
Court decided in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius that 
requiring states to participate in the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional, and 
so the expansion became optional at the state level (Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2012). As a result, many states – 19 at the time that this was written 
(Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2015b) – have elected not to implement the 
expansion, leaving many of their low income citizens without access to health care.  
However, Medicaid – similar to means-tested public programs in other nations – 
also contains several weaknesses as a lower “tier” system, as we’ll shortly discuss. 
Apart from the Medicaid expansion, the Affordable Care Act sought to reduce 
uninsurance through the “Romneycare” private-sector mechanism discussed 
earlier. Essentially, everyone not covered by either their employer or by a 
government program would be required to purchase private health insurance.  The 
underlying structure is frequently described by the metaphor of a “three-legged 
stool,” which is meant to emphasize the interdependence of the law’s three “legs”: 
if any single leg were to be removed, as Jonathan Gruber has argued, the law 
would largely cease to function. The three-legged stool, to some extent, can be 
thought of as a mechanism to circumvent the inherently unstable private health 
insurance market.  Selling insurance plans as if they were any other commodity 
runs up against three substantial problems. First, those who need health insurance 
the most – the sick – are poor investments for insurers, who will either deny them 
policies or charge them prohibitively high premiums. Second, those who are well 
have an incentive, as Gruber notes, to not purchase health insurance until they 
become sick; this destroys the actuarial framework necessary for an insurance 
system. Third, many of the uninsured can simply not afford to purchase insurance 
at market prices, even if insurers charge the same to all, whether sick or well 
(Gruber 2010). 
Each of these pitfalls is met by the one of the three “legs” of the ACA (Gruber 
2010). The first pitfall is met by the ACA requirement that insurers not 
discriminate on the basis of medical condition in the sale of insurance plans.  
Insurers can neither decline to sell a plan to an individual with a “medical 
condition” nor charge him or her a higher premium because of it. The second 
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pitfall is met by the “individual mandate,” which, as discussed, has its roots in a 
conservative health care proposal. By forcing everyone to buy health insurance, the 
law prevents individuals from waiting until they are sick to buy insurance.  The 
third pitfall is met by public subsidies that allow individuals of low income to 
purchase private health insurance. These subsidies are graded by an individual’s 
income; the lower the income, the higher subsidy, thereby making the purchase of 
private insurance plans affordable to those for whom insurance would otherwise be 
out of reach.4 Overall, the three-legged stool breathes new life into the private 
health insurance industry: it attempts to address the intrinsic difficulty in 
simultaneously treating health insurance as a market commodity while aiming to 
make it universal.   
Other aspects of the ACA further solidify this system (Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2013).  For instance, the law has certain requirements for the benefit 
packages offered by these plans. It additionally creates online “exchanges” for 
individuals to shop for health insurance plans. The law also contains, like the 
Nixon plan, an “employer mandate.” The employer mandate, once in full effect, 
will require that businesses with greater than 50 workers pay a penalty if they do 
not provide sufficient insurance for their workers, and if one of their workers goes 
to purchase heath insurance on the exchanges (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid 
and the Uninsured 2015). We’ll further explore some additional aspects of the law 
in the sections ahead, but for now will turn to the question of how this combination 
of provisions affects health care access in the U.S. 
 
 
6. The Uninsured and the ACA 
 
At the dawn of the ACA era, uninsurance was a severe problem.  A report from the 
Kaiser Family Foundation gives a picture of this scene (Kaiser Commission on 
Medicaid and the Uninsured 2015). The first decade of the twentieth-century saw a 
decline in rates of insurance provided by employers, which was further exacerbated 
by the Great Recession of 2008. By 2013, more than 41 million US residents less 
than age 65 lacked health insurance. These individuals were mostly members of 
working families, predominantly of either low or moderate income. Levels of 
uninsurance varied with type of occupation, with “blue collar” workers having 
higher levels of uninsurance than “white collar” workers.  A substantial proportion 
of the uninsured were living in poverty. They were disproportionately racial 
minorities, either black or Hispanic. However, even though those without US 
citizenship were much more likely to be uninsured, most of the uninsured – 80% – 
were in fact citizens.  Finally, it is worth noting that rates of uninsurance differed 
substantially from state to state. Some 15 states had uninsurance rates among the 
nonelderly of less than 12%, whereas 16 states – concentrated in the southeast and 
southwest but also including California – had uninsurance rates exceeding 16%.5   
_____________ 
 
4  The discussion of the “three-legged stool” in this and the paragraph draws on the article of Gruber, as cited. 
5  We rely throughout this paragraph on the 2015 Kaiser report cited at the beginning of the paragraph. These are 
2013 numbers.   
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A substantial portion of the United States thereby lacked access to health 
insurance in the early twentieth-century. Much research documents the detrimental 
consequences of uninsurance for individuals and families, from the perspectives of 
health care access and household finances (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and 
the Uninsured 2015). Among those with chronic illnesses, for instance, lack of 
insurance translates into a lower likelihood of seeing a doctor (Wilper et al. 2008).  
Lack of health insurance has also been associated with increased mortality in the 
general population (Wilper et al. 2009). Many have placed great hope in the 
potential of the ACA to address this deadly problem.   
However, the amelioration provided by the ACA will be partial only.  Before 
describing some estimates, it’s worth noting that there is still significant 
uncertainty about the ultimate effect of the ACA. As Blumenthal and Collins wrote 
in a description of the ACA’s effects on coverage in 2014, the effect of the law 
cannot be reduced to a single number:  
Ultimately, the success of the coverage expansions of the law will be judged by 
their effect on a set of variables: the numbers of uninsured Americans, the 
adequacy of insurance (which will perhaps best be judged by the number of people 
who remain underinsured), and the affordability of private coverage. It may take 
years, however, before we can render a considered judgment on these critical 
outcomes (Blumenthal and Collins 2014).  
With that caveat in mind, it’s worth having a glance at the estimates of the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the ACA’s health coverage impact 
(Congressional Budget Office 2015). As we have described, the ACA expands 
health insurance through two main approaches: the expansion of Medicaid to those 
earning <138% of the federal poverty level, and the provision of government 
credits for individuals to purchase health insurance on “exchanges.” By 2025, the 
CBO estimates that an additional 14 million Americans will be receiving coverage 
from Medicaid. It estimates that in that same year, some 22 million will purchase 
private health insurance plans on the “exchanges,” 16 million of whom will do so 
using government credits.  Accounting for an estimated decline in private insurance 
outside the exchanges, the CBO estimates that the ACA will result in a net 
reduction in the number of uninsured by 25 million in 2025. Thus, whereas an 
estimated 52 million would have been uninsured in that year without the ACA, it 
estimates that 27 million will be uninsured by that time with the ACA, which 
translates to a 10% overall uninsurance rate (excluding undocumented immigrants, 
that number becomes 7%). In summary, though it is tantamount to the largest 
expansion in health care coverage since the passage of Medicaid and Medicare in 
1965, the ACA will still not achieve even the limited goal of “universal coverage.” 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the goal of “universal coverage” 
is itself a limited one.  The ACA expands coverage along multiple tiers, in which 
benefits, coverage, and access are unequal.  Medicaid, which again is the means-
tested system of health care for the poor, is – as the headline of one article puts it – 
a “[f]lawed but [b]eneficial” program (Frakt et al. 2011).  There is little doubt that 
the program helps many.  As Frakt et al. argue, the notion that Medicaid is 
somehow inferior to no coverage at all – as some have argued on the basis of a 
limited number of studies – lacks any clear scientific rationale and is belied by 
other studies (Frakt et al. 2011, Frakt and Carroll 2013).  For instance, one notable 
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study found that pre-ACA Medicaid expansions in three states were associated 
with significantly reduced all-cause mortality (Sommers, Baicker, and Epstein 
2012).   
That being said, health systems specifically designated for the poor may be at 
increased risk of cutbacks and limitations in access, even when benefits are broad.  
For instance, in comparison with Medicare – a universal system relied upon by the 
great majority of older Americans – Medicaid reimburses providers at lower rates, 
a fact which likely contributes to reduced access to providers by Medicaid 
beneficiaries, a fact which likely explains evidence pointing to relatively inferior 
access to specialty care for those with Medicaid (Skinner and Mayer 2007).  Other 
evidence similarly points to disparities in access to care based on insurance.  For 
instance, the Medicaid programs of many states have erected barriers to access to 
an important new hepatitis C drug (Barua et al. 2015).  Such inequalities 
demonstrate how universal coverage is by no means tantamount to the elimination 
of inequalities in health care.  
 
 
7. The ACA and the Rise of Consumerist Health Care 
 
Thus, the health care system of the United States – even with the full 
implementation of the ACA – is still notable for its lack of universal coverage.  
However, it is equally important to emphasize how the US health care system – 
again both before and after the ACA – impedes access in a separate way: through 
high cost sharing at the time of health care use, a phenomenon crassly described as 
giving patients “skin in the game.” The idea here is that individuals who are 
financially exposed to the costs of their medical care at the time of use (i.e. have 
“skin in the game”) will use health care more judiciously, whereas those who are 
fully covered (either by private insurance or the government) will be less 
concerned through the benefits or costs of care (Bach 2008).   
First, it is important to recognize that giving patients more “skin in the game” 
has long been a goal of some US health care economists and policy thinkers.  
Timothy Jost, for instance, has described and critiqued the emergence of a 
“consumer-driven” health care movement in American medicine that sought to 
impose greater patient contribution to health care costs (Jost 2007). Exposing 
health care consumers to the costs of their health care, some have longed argued, 
helps to prevent against the utilization of unnecessary services that results from the 
“moral hazard” of health care that is free at time of use (Geyman 2007). This shift 
to an embrace of skin in the game ideology – in contradistinction to the early health 
care proposals of Ted Kennedy, or the health care systems of Canada, Britain, and 
elsewhere – might fairly be described as a “neoliberal” shift in health care thought 
(Gaffney 2015). 
Having high exposure to out-of-pocket medical costs despite having insurance 
has been called “underinsurance” (Banthin and Bernard 2006, Schoen et al. 2008), 
and understanding this phenomenon is crucial to understanding the US health care 
system, and the limitations of the ACA. Preceding the ACA, the twentieth-first 
century saw a rise in “skin in the game” for patients.  Between 1996 and 2003, for 
instance, Banthin and Bernard described a significant rise in the out-of-pocket 
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health care burden of Americans: a total of 17.1 million nonelderly individuals 
with insurance were underinsured in 2003, which they defined as having a “health 
care services burden” (not including insurance premiums) of more than 10% of 
disposable family income.  More vulnerable groups were more likely to have high 
out-of-pocket financial burden to health care, including those with physical 
limitations and a variety of chronic medical conditions (Banthin and Bernard 
2006).  Another study, which used a broader definition of underinsurance, found a 
60% increase in rates of underinsurance among nonelderly adults between 2003 
and 2007. The consequences of underinsurance in this study included forgoing 
health care and having “high rates of financial stress related to medical bills” 
(Schoen et al. 2008).  By 2010, the percent of underinsured nonelderly adults was 
almost double what it was in 2003 (22% vs. 12.3%) (Schoen et al. 2011). The 
financial impact of underinsurance, especially for poor, working class, and middle 
class families, can be profound.  A frequently cited study, for instance, described 
the growing problem of “medical bankruptcy.” A majority of bankruptcies, it 
demonstrated, have medical causes, yet at the same time a majority of those going 
bankrupt are actually insured (Himmelstein et al. 2009). In addition to the financial 
consequences, however, high cost sharing may have deleterious health 
consequences, especially for the poor and chronically ill (Brook et al. 1983, 
Geyman 2007).  
There was some hope that the ACA would reverse the trend towards rising 
underinsurance, with one group estimating a possible 70% reduction in 
underinsurance with full implementation of the law (Schoen et al. 2011).  This 
would primarily be made possible through the subsidies provided under the ACA 
for private insurance premiums and cost sharing – the third “leg” of the three-
legged stool discussed earlier. Such an optimistic prediction, however, seems rather 
unlikely, for several reasons.   
First, the law does nothing to accommodate rising cost sharing – or “skin in the 
game” – for employer-provided health insurance, which is still the form of 
insurance relied upon by the majority of non-elderly Americans. This is a problem 
because – over the last decade – insurance plans for insured workers have 
increasingly included additional payments beyond annual premiums, even while 
workers’ proportionate contribution to insurance premiums has risen (Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation 2015a). The ACA’s so-called Cadillac tax – an excise 
tax on expensive but by no means luxurious health care plans which goes into 
effect in 2018 – may already be encouraging employers to increase the amount of 
cost sharing in the insurance plans they provide to their employees (Health Policy 
Brief 2013).   
Second, the health insurance plans offered for purchase on the exchanges were 
structured under the ACA to have relatively high levels of cost sharing.  Such cost 
sharing takes a number of forms in US health care plans, including include 
copayments, deductibles, and coinsurance. Copayments are fixed out-of-pocket 
payments – paid at the time of use – for health care services like physicians visits 
or for prescription drugs. A deductible is the amount a patient must pay out-of-
pocket for health care services over the course of a year before the insurer begins 
paying. Co-insurance is a percent of the price of a health care service that the 
insured must pay out-of-pocket: 30% co-insurance for a drug requires that patients 
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pay 30% of the price of the drug while the insurer pays the other 70%. Plans 
offered on the ACA exchanges frequently incorporate all three types of cost 
sharing (Claxton, Cox, and Rae 2015).  
These exchange plans come in four main “metallic” tiers: bronze, silver, gold, 
and platinum. The “value” of each tier, however, is based entirely on actuarial 
calculations. The four tiers have 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% actuarial values, 
respectively (for those with low-income, cost-sharing subsidies are available that 
increase these values).  It’s important to emphasize, however, that these figures 
represent the proportion of average health care costs covered by insurer, based on 
actuarial estimations, over the course of a year for all members within a given 
metallic tier. Thus, for a particular individual or a family with (for example) a 
bronze plan, out-of-pocket payments can be higher than 40% of overall health care 
costs. Importantly, these actuarial values apply only to in-network benefits: 
families that obtain care outside of the insurance network of provider are largely 
unprotected (Claxton, Cox, and Rae 2015).   
There are also, it’s important to point out, out-of-pocket maximums.  However, 
these can be as high as $6,600 for those with individual plans and $13,200 for 
family plans (Claxton, Cox, and Rae 2015).  (There are lower caps for those with 
lower incomes). Still, this leaves the potential for very high residual out-of-pocket 
health care costs for many. For instance, the average deductible for 2016 for a 
family silver plan is $6,480, while in 2015 the average specialist copayment for 
those with a silver plan was $57 (HealthPocket 2015b, a)  In a sense, the structure 
of these plans represents a sort of triumph for so-called “consumer-directed” health 
care, even if they do not go explicitly by that name. Though more time is needed to 
accurately understand the precise effects of the ACA on underinsurance, a survey 
conducted in the second half of 2014 demonstrated no substantial change in 
underinsurance from earlier in the decade, while the percent of those with a high 
deductible continued to rise (Collins et al. 2015). 
Underinsurance, it’s worth emphasizing, is – in the views of many – essentially 
an intentional goal. As opposed to systems where most health care services are free 
at point of use – as in Canadian Medicare or the British National Health Service – 
the United States has come to accept a “consumer-driven” model in which out-of-
pocket payments, often substantial, are the norm among the insured.  This reflects 
an embrace of a commodified vision of health care, and a rejection of an approach 
that treats it as a social good or human right. 
 
 
8. An Age of Consolidation?  
 
The story of health care in the ACA era would not be complete, however, without a 
discussion of the process of corporate consolidation that is unfolding in parallel 
with the changes thus far described.  Consolidation is happening on several levels: 
“horizontally,” or between hospitals, and “vertically,” between hospitals and other 
types of health care facilities like physicians groups or nursing homes (Cutler and 
Scott Morton 2013). The result is larger, sometimes oligopolistic health care 
systems. Additionally, there have also been reports of moves towards consolidation 
in the insurance and pharmaceutical industry (Abelson 2015).  
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In part, these dynamics can be seen as a response to the ACA.  The law, as one 
observer has described, “unleashed a merger frenzy, with hospitals scrambling to 
shore up their market positions, improve operational efficiency, and create 
organizations capable of managing population health” (Dafny 2014). Greater 
organizational size gives health systems pricing power when they come to the 
bargaining table with insurers. Simultaneously, however, the ACA included 
provisions specifically promoting the formation of “Accountable Care 
Organizations” (ACOs) under Medicare (Berenson and Burton 2011). ACOs are 
now seeing rapid growth and are quickly becoming critical – and at some point, 
possibly dominant – elements of the American health care landscape.    
The ACO is best understood in relation to the HMO/managed care strategy, as 
we earlier saw advocated by Ellwood, Nixon, and Enthoven. ACOs, like the HMOs 
of the 1980s and 1990s, are seen as a way to lower health care costs by inducing a 
change in financial incentives away from a fee-for-service model that rewards the 
provision of more care towards – in theory – the provision of less expensive but 
still high quality care (Berenson and Burton 2011). The great unpopularity of 
HMOs – among both providers and patients – contributed to their retreat in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. The ACO can thus be interpreted as an effort to embrace 
key elements of the HMO, while avoiding the shortcomings that led to its 
unpopularity. Berenson and Burton succinctly describe the key features of the 
ACO, as well as its key differences with HMOs: 
ACOs consist of networks of providers that are rewarded financially if they can 
slow the growth in their patients’ health care spending while maintaining or 
improving the quality of the care they deliver. An important difference between 
HMOs and ACOs is that providers themselves, rather than an often distant 
insurance company, control the diagnosis and treatment decisions, but exercise this 
control under new payment incentives that encourage greater prudence in the use of 
health services. Furthermore … patients retain the freedom to seek additional 
services from any clinician or facility at any time. And to prevent providers from 
inappropriately limiting patients’ access to services in order to save money, the 
ACO is monitored through its performance on a suite of quality measures... 
(Berenson and Burton 2011). 
There is more than a passing similarity here to Enthoven’s, or Ellwood’s, 
managed care organizations; indeed, as some have argued, the points of similarity 
between the HMO and the ACO –  and not the differences – are the more relevant 
fact (Himmelstein and Woolhandler 2014). Quality monitoring – an essential 
safeguard against the abuses of the HMO era – is, as Himmelstein and 
Woolhandler note, highly susceptible to gaming.  Capitation, they argue, invariably 
leaves open the door to further skimping of care.  Additionally, they note that the 
current dynamic towards a small number of large, powerful ACOs that are able to 
dominate particular regional markets is itself a problematic development. “… [A] 
system dominated by profit-maximizing oligopolies,” as they put it, “is a perilous 
route to savings.” Nonetheless, the stage is currently set for the continued growth 
of ACOs. Medicare legislation passed in 2015, for instance, will strongly 
incentivize physicians to be paid through ACOs or another “alternative payment 
model,” as opposed to the traditional fee-for-service model (Oberlander and 
Laugesen 2015, Pham et al. 2015). The private sector is likely to follow. Thus, if 
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current dynamics continue, it is possible that we will see a health care landscape 
increasingly centered on large, consolidated health care systems – either operating 
in parallel to large insurance companies, or maybe combining with them.   
    From a broader, longer-term perspective, these changes can be seen as the most 
recent chapter in a process of health industry consolidation and commercialization, 
stretching back decades. This dynamic also clearly has international reach.  For 
instance, some have likened the NHS’s Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) – 
created by the Health and Social Care Act of 2012 – to American HMOs and 
ACOs (Pollock and Roderick 2015). Indeed, the British health secretary himself 
made the ACO comparison (Pollock and Roderick 2015). This embrace of market-
based American solutions will likely have detrimental effects for nations that had 
previously embraced a universalist-model of health care, premised on the notion of 





In this article, we have sought to place the ACA in historical and political context.  
As we have seen, many of the dynamics of the previous century of health care 
reform efforts were still at play in the early twenty-first century. The 
accommodation of powerful health care interests led to a health care reform in 
which the private health insurance industry retained a predominant position. The 
intrinsic contradiction of attaining a state of universal, or even near-universal 
coverage, through for-profit private health insurance on its own necessitated the 
large-scale transfer of public resources to the private sector, so as to permit the 
subsidized purchase of insurance plans. At the same time, the approach still 
required that the patients who represent the poorest investment (from the 
commercial perspective) be covered by the public sector – e.g. the poor by 
Medicaid and the elderly by Medicare. The resultant patchwork – expanded, but 
overall maintained, by the ACA – is nonetheless neither equitable nor efficient.  As 
we have examined, uninsurance will continue under the ACA, while 
underinsurance has essentially become enshrined by the law.  Still, the ACA did 
help millions gain access to health coverage (albeit often inadequate), reducing the 
overall rate of uninsurance. 
A number of lessons might be drawn from the US experience for those 
endeavoring towards health system change (or preservation) in other nations.  First, 
there is much to be learned from the political history of US health care reform.  As 
we saw, the fact that a system of universal health care was never created in the US 
in the twentieth century reflected (in part) an adverse balance of power between 
constituencies that would have gained from reform and those who would have lost.  
The power of health care interests—first physicians, later corporate entities—
outweighed that of those who supported it, like organized labor.  As the balance of 
power between such groups evolves in other nations, attempts to roll back the 
scope and potency of universal health care systems should be anticipated.  Second, 
however, we believe that the example of the ACA demonstrates the policy 
shortcomings of health care reform that give precedence to the prerogatives of 
corporate health care interests.  Other nations seeking to move towards “universal 
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health coverage” through the subsidized provision of private health insurance plans 
to all (or almost all) will likely have many of the same shortcomings as the US 
system, including its inefficiencies, inadequacies, and injustices. 
It should be noted that the ACA is by no means the only path for the US.  An 
alternate single-payer approach to health care reform – in which the entire nation is 
covered under one public plan, without cost-sharing and without the for-profit 
provision of care – was, and is, possible (Woolhandler et al. 2003, Gaffney et al. 
2016). From the health policy perspective, there is much to recommend such 
single-payer health care reform – administrative simplicity, substantial savings on 
pharmaceuticals, and the end of both uninsurance and underinsurance.  The barriers 
to such an approach – both in the present and in the past – are, of course, political.   
Moving towards such an alternative approach to health care – that is to say, 
transforming health care into a social right – will therefore invariably necessitate 
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